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ESSAY: JUSTICE STEVENS’ 
JURISPRUDENCE OF RESPECT 
Nancy S. Marder* 
As anyone who has ever met Justice Stevens knows, he treats 
everyone with the utmost respect and civility. At some point in most 
reminiscences, there is a story about the respect he shows others, 
which illustrates his humanity, and quite simply, “what a nice guy he 
is.” I will contribute my stories as well. But I believe that his deep 
and abiding respect for people speaks to more than just 
comportment; it provides the foundation for his jurisprudence–a 
jurisprudence of respect. 
Justice Stevens treats people, whether law clerks, lawyers, or 
litigants, with the utmost respect and assumes that they perform their 
jobs with the best intentions. He takes a similar view of the judiciary 
and the legislature. In his review of lower court opinions, his 
jurisprudence of respect translates into a regard for the work that 
lower court judges do in both the federal and state court systems and 
an effort to recognize and build upon that work whenever possible. 
In the realm of statutory construction, Justice Stevens’ jurisprudence 
of respect means interpreting statutes to give effect to Congress’ 
broad purpose, which can be discerned from the text, legislative 
history, context, and related sources. 
I had the privilege of clerking for Justice Stevens for two years 
(1990–1992). When I began my clerkship, my only legal experience 
had been working for one year at a law firm and clerking for two 
years for lower court judges. My co-clerks had similar work 
experience. By that point, Justice Stevens had been a Justice for 
fifteen years, a court of appeals judge for five years, and a practicing 
lawyer for twenty years.1 Yet, Justice Stevens listened to our views 
 
 * Clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens, October Terms 1990 and 1991. Professor of Law and 
Director, Jury Center, Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
 1. Justice Stevens entered private practice in 1949, after having served as a law clerk to 
Justice Wiley Rutledge. BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN, JOHN PAUL STEVENS: AN 
INDEPENDENT LIFE 79–80 (2010). He was appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit in 1970 by President Nixon and served until 1975, when he was appointed to the U.S. 
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on cases and considered our arguments. He respected the ideas of his 
law clerks, even though we were new to the law. 
The high point of the clerkship for me, and probably for most of 
Justice Stevens’ law clerks over the course of his almost thirty-five 
years at the Supreme Court, was the early morning or late afternoon 
discussion of cases. Justice Stevens would come into the clerks’ 
office and sit in his worn leather chair. The conversation might begin 
with a newspaper headline or a sports event, but it would soon shift 
into a discussion of the cases. Justice Stevens was always interested 
in what his clerks had to say about a case. He might agree or 
disagree, but he would always take our arguments seriously. If he 
disagreed, he would come in the next day, having given additional 
thought to the argument, and say where he now stood on the issue 
and what he found persuasive. He always made us feel that he 
respected our opinions and listened carefully to them. 
The discussion of the case would continue during the drafting of 
an opinion because, as Justice Stevens taught us, arguments that 
seem persuasive in discussion might reveal their weaknesses in the 
writing process. At the time when I clerked for Justice Stevens, he 
was the only Justice who wrote his own first drafts of opinions.2 He 
adhered to this practice for his entire time at the Court. This meant 
that his opinions always reflected his views and were always written 
in his voice. For example, in a case in which Justice Stevens 
dissented because he believed the Court was reading a statute too 
literally and ignoring Congress’ purpose, he wrote, as few clerks 
could have done, that the Court was reading the statute with “its 
thick grammarian’s spectacles.”3 Similarly, no law clerk would have 
 
Supreme Court by President Ford. COMM’N ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE U.S. CONST., THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS BEGINNINGS AND ITS JUSTICES 1790–1991, at 228 
(1992).  
 2. For seventeen years—from the time Justice Marshall retired in 1991 to the time that 
Justice Alito left the certiorari pool (“cert. pool”) in 2008—Justice Stevens was also the only 
Justice who did not belong to the cert. pool. This was a practice he maintained throughout his 
entire tenure on the Court. Instead, Justice Stevens’ law clerks reviewed all of the certiorari 
petitions rather than depending on just one law clerk from the cert. pool who advised the other 
Justices. See Adam Liptak, A Second Justice Opts Out of a Longtime Custom: The ‘Cert. Pool,’ 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at A21 (reporting that Kathleen Arberg, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
public information officer, had confirmed Justice Alito’s exit from the cert. pool). 
 3. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 103, 113 (1991) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Protect Unions from Members, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 20, 1991, at A24 (highlighting that part of Justice Stevens’ dissent in which he “said that the 
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thought to refer to “propaganda broadcasts to our troops by ‘Tokyo 
Rose’ during World War II” in Citizens United v. FEC4 because no 
law clerk had lived through that experience. In Texas v. Johnson, the 
flag-burning case, he also wrote from the perspective of one who had 
fought for his country during World War II.5 
Although Justice Stevens wrote his own first drafts, he depended 
on his law clerks to fill in the gaps, and in this role, we tried to make 
a contribution. Justice Stevens made us feel that the writing process 
was a collaborative one. He usually accepted our suggestions and 
was as thrilled as we were when we found cases to support a 
particular point or added a footnote that undermined an argument 
raised by the majority opinion when he was in the dissent. Justice 
Stevens treated our work with respect, and this in turn inspired us to 
try to produce the best work we possibly could. 
Justice Stevens also treated lawyers who appeared at oral 
argument before the Supreme Court with great respect. He tried to 
put them at their ease. After all, arguing a Supreme Court case is not 
a common, everyday experience for most lawyers. For example, it is 
an oft-repeated story among Justice Stevens’ law clerks that during 
one oral argument a lawyer kept referring to the justices as judges. 
The lawyer became even more flustered after being corrected several 
times by the Chief Justice. Justice Stevens came to the lawyer’s aid 
by making the following observation: “Excuse me, but if I am not 
mistaken Article III makes the same mistake.” His comment relieved 
the tension of the moment and also showed respect for the lawyer 
and the Constitution. 
Justice Stevens, alone among the Justices, would often preface 
his questioning of a lawyer by asking: “May I ask you a question?”6 
 
Court had ignored the overall purpose of the attorney’s fees law by examining the statute only 
through ‘its thick grammarian’s spectacles’”). 
 4. 130 S. Ct. 876, 947 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Adam Liptak, From Age of 
Independence to Age of Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2010, at A1 (“In Citizens United, [Justice 
Stevens] referred to Tokyo Rose, the World War II propagandist. ‘My clerks didn’t know where 
that came from,’ he said last week.”). 
 5. 491 U.S. 397, 436–37 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 6. See, e.g., Jeffrey Kahn, Zoya’s Standing Problem, or, When Should the Constitution 
Follow the Flag?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 673, 716 (2010) (providing an excerpt of an oral argument 
that includes Justice Stevens asking Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, “[C]an I ask you a 
question[?]”); Jeffrey Toobin, After Stevens: What Will the Supreme Court Be Like Without Its 
Liberal Leader?, NEW YORKER, Mar. 22, 2010, at 38, 39 (“[Justice Stevens] does something that 
none of his colleagues do: he asks permission. ‘May I ask you a question?’ or ‘May I ask you 
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Although his questions were inevitably the most difficult, and went 
to the crux of the issue, his manner of asking was always courteous 
and respectful. He approached oral argument as a collaborative 
endeavor between Justices and lawyers. He sought their aid in 
understanding how far their arguments reached and what the 
implications of their positions were, and used oral argument to 
clarify his own thinking about a case.7 
Nowhere was Justice Stevens’ respect for individuals more 
essential than in his treatment of pro se petitioners. A few of these 
petitioners were “frequent filers” at the U.S. Supreme Court, 
meaning they filed numerous certiorari petitions. Eventually, the 
Court decided to amend Rule 39 so that pro se petitioners could be 
denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis.8 Justice Stevens 
dissented, suggesting that such an amendment was unwise.9 He 
explained that it was preferable to let these petitioners file in forma 
pauperis certiorari petitions, and deny the petitions on the merits if 
they were frivolous rather than prevent the petitioners from filing 
altogether.10 At least if the petitions were denied on the merits, the 
petitioners could feel that their claims had been considered, whereas 
if they were not permitted to file at all, the courthouse doors would 
have been closed to them. Moreover, there was always the possibility 
that one of their pro se petitions contained a meritorious claim. Every 
so often it happens, and when it does, as it did in Gideon v. 
Wainwright,11 it can change the course of the law. 
Justice Stevens treated law clerks, lawyers, and litigants with 
respect, and this personal code of conduct also infused his 
jurisprudence. In my view, he adhered to “a jurisprudence of 
 
this?’”). 
 7. John Paul Stevens, Learning on the Job, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1561, 1563 (2006) 
(“[P]re-argument predictions about how a judge or Justice is likely to vote are far less significant 
than the knowledge that he or she will analyze the cases with an open mind and with respect for 
the law as it exists at the time of the decision.”). 
 8. See In re Amendment to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13 (1991) (per curiam). 
 9. Id. at 14. 
 10. Id. Justice Stevens also explained that it was easier to deny a petition on the merits than 
to decide if it was frivolous, and the cost of administering the amended rule would probably be 
greater than any administrative benefit. Id. 
 11. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), and holding that 
the Sixth Amendment’s provision of the right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions was 
applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). 
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respect.” In his opinions, he was always respectful of lower court 
judges in the federal and state court systems, and recognized that 
they tried to perform their job conscientiously. 
Justice Stevens showed respect for lower court judges’ efforts 
especially when they tried to follow the Supreme Court’s test, only to 
find that the test had changed. In Purkett v. Elem,12 the Supreme 
Court held that a reason for a peremptory challenge need not be one 
“that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal 
protection,”13 even though the Court had said earlier in Batson v. 
Kentucky that the reason must be “related to the particular case to be 
tried.”14 Justice Stevens disagreed with the Court when it corrected 
the Eighth Circuit judges for following what the Supreme Court had 
instructed them to do in Batson. He found the Court’s approach to be 
“disrespectful to the conscientious judges on the Court of Appeals 
who faithfully applied an unambiguous standard articulated in one of 
[the Court’s] opinions” and that “[t]o criticize those judges for doing 
their jobs is singularly inappropriate.”15 Moreover, the Court did this 
in a per curiam opinion, without “the courtesy” of full briefing and 
oral argument.16 
In his opinions, Justice Stevens often commended lower court 
judges for their work and incorporated their reasons into his opinion. 
For example, in Chapman v. United States,17 which came to the U.S. 
Supreme Court from an en banc decision by the Seventh Circuit,18 
several defendants challenged their sentences because the weight of 
the carrier had been included in the weight of the drug, making their 
sentence much longer than it would have been if based only on the 
weight of the drug. Justice Stevens, writing in a dissent joined by 
Justice Marshall, did not think that Congress could have intended to 
include the weight of the carrier of the L.S.D. as part of the weight of 
 
 12. 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam). 
 13. Id. at 769. 
 14. 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986). 
 15. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 774 n.8. 
 16. Id. at 774; see also id. at 770, 775 (arguing that it is “unwise” for the Court to announce 
a law-changing decision without briefing and argument). 
 17. 500 U.S. 453 (1991). 
 18. United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. 
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991). 
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the L.S.D.19 His dissent built upon the reasons provided by five 
Circuit judges in their two dissenting opinions.20 When faced with 
ambiguous language and sparse legislative history, Justice Stevens 
opted for an interpretation that furthered Congress’ goals, in contrast 
to the Court’s interpretation, which, in Justice Stevens’ words, 
“show[ed] little respect for Congress’ handiwork.”21 
Justice Stevens saw his job as not only building upon the work 
of lower courts—where there were many fine judges—but also  
trying to give effect to the purposes of Congress when it enacted 
legislation. In construing a statute, he looked to the broad purposes 
that motivated Congress to act in the first place. In the realm of 
statutes, “Congress is the master.”22 
For example, in West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. 
Casey,23 Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by Justices Marshall and 
Blackmun, considered Congress’ purposes in providing a 
“reasonable attorney’s fee” to a prevailing party in a civil rights 
case.24 After studying the text and the legislative history, he 
concluded that Congress intended to make a prevailing party whole, 
and therefore, intended the cost of an expert witness fee to be 
included in a “reasonable attorney’s fee.” The statute did not 
explicitly say this, but the reading he gave was one that tried to 
effectuate Congress’ broad purpose. To do otherwise would be to 
disrespect a coequal branch of government and to make it redo the 
work it had already done. He explained: “[W]e do the country a 
disservice when we needlessly ignore persuasive evidence of 
Congress’ actual purpose and require it ‘to take the time to revisit the 
matter’ and to restate its purpose in more precise English whenever 
its work product suffers from an omission or inadvertent error.”25 
Justice Stevens’ jurisprudence of respect recognizes the roles 
that various institutions play in our democracy and appreciates that 
 
 19. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 468–69 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 20. Chief Judge Bauer and Judges Wood, Cudahy, and Posner joined Judge Cummings’ 
dissent. Marshall, 908 F.2d at 1326. All of these judges also joined Judge Posner’s dissent. Id. at 
1331. 
 21. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 477. 
 22. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 23. Id. at 83. 
 24. Id. at 103 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 25. Id. at 115 (footnote omitted). 
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each institution tries to play its role as best it can. Congress passes 
statutes, and the Court is often called upon to interpret them. When 
there are competing interpretations, the Court must choose one. 
However, the Court can perform this role while still showing respect 
to Congress by trying to interpret the statute in a manner that gives 
effect to Congress’ broad purpose. 
Whether questioning a lawyer during oral argument or 
construing a statute, Justice Stevens’ efforts were guided by a respect 
for the individuals and institutions involved. I had the opportunity to 
observe this first-hand for the two years that I served as his law clerk, 
and I have had the opportunity ever since to try to learn from Justice 
Stevens’ example and to share this knowledge with my students. 
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